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This paper examines the desirability of supply-side intervention
within a monetary union, given the constraints on monetary and ﬁscal
policy, and compares it with an economic framework characterized by
the independence of monetary policy. To this end, ﬁrstly, we develop
a simple two-country model in order to analyse in strategic terms
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The costs of losing the exchange rate and monetary policy as instruments
of macroeconomic stabilization, acquire a special importance when deciding
the convenience of forming a monetary union. Most of the theoretical and
empirical studies conclude that these costs will depend on the asymmetry of
the shocks. So, for instance, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) found that the
costs imposed by asymmetric shocks in an European monetary union would
be large, since these shocks require country-speciﬁc adjustment policies.
Another question broadly discussed is that, in the absence of fully ﬂexible
prices and wages, as well as labour mobility, as adjustment mechanisms,
governments have to deal with shocks using mainly ﬁscal policy. But the
disciplining eﬀects of a monetary union may require some limitations on the
use of ﬁscal policy. We can mention, as an example, the ﬁscal discipline
imposed by the Pact for Stability and Growth in the European monetary
union. Since ﬁscal policy in monetary unions may be ineﬃcient, the case for
ﬁscal policy coordination has been discussed; see, e.g. Díaz-Roldán (2000a).
On the other hand, given these limitations to the use of ﬁscal policy, it
would be desirable to have other alternative policies available. Among them,
the possibility of using supply-side policies has been discussed (Jimeno, 1992);
however, the available literature has hardly studied supply-side policies. An
exception is De Miguel and Sosvilla (2001), who develop a two-country model
in order to analyse the eﬀects of macroeconomic policies in a monetary union,
with diﬀerent degrees of wage rigidity, where supply policies are represented
by changes in the employers’ social security contributions, having a direct
impact on real wages.
In this paper we examine the desirability of supply side intervention
within a monetary union, given the constraints on monetary and ﬁscal
policy, and compares it with an economic framework characterized by the
independence of monetary policy. To this end, we ﬁrst develop a simple two-
country model in order to analyse in strategic terms how the authorities can
deal, in the short-run, with monetary, real and supply shocks, and the extent
to which supply side intervention may be useful to deal with those shocks.
The authorities can act individually or cooperatively and, in the rest of
the paper, we will identify authorities cooperation with policy coordination.
Secondly, we modify the model so that the two countries form a monetary
union. In particular, an independent central bank controls monetary policy
within the monetary union, and supply policies are determined by the
2authorities at the national level. Next, we study whether the formation of
a monetary union could be beneﬁtial when there is coordination over labour
market intervention. This approach should allow us to answer the main
question of our study: to what extent supply-side coordination is required in
a monetary union as compared to the previous situation in which monetary
policy was conducted at the national level. In other words, we try to ﬁnd the
conditions that could support the coordination of supply-side intervention in
a monetary union.
As an original contribution of this paper, we can mention, ﬁrst of all,
that we make use of a model speciﬁcally designed for a monetary union.
This type of models are not frequent in the literature, and we have used a
simpliﬁcation of the model developed in Díaz-Roldán (2000b). An important
result derived from our analysis is that the desirability of supply-side policies
coordination is not only related to the characteristics of the shocks, but is
also related to how their eﬀects are transmitted among countries. Secondly,
we analyse the role of supply policies, something also hardly discussed in the
literature. Since supply-side policies are presumed to be useful to deal with
labour market ineﬃciencies, our supply-side instrument could be thought as
a way of institutional intervention in the labour market.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 a theoretical two-
country model is developed, which will allow us to study the possibility
of coordination of supply policies, and the welfare aspects of the optimal
solution. In section 3 the two-country model is modify in order to describe
a monetary union, which will allow us to study the eﬀects of shocks on the
union’s member countries. Finally, in section 4 the main conclusions are
shown together with the policy implications.
2A t w o - c o u n t r y m o d e l
2.1 Setup of the model
We will consider a model of two symmetric economies, country 1 and country
2, with ﬂexible exchange rates and perfect capital mobility between them.
This last assumption implies that the countries’ interest rates are equal to
the world’s interest rate denoted by r.
The set of equations for country 1 is as follows, and a similar setup holds
for country 2:
3y1 = −αr + β(e + p2 − p1)+δy2 + f1 (1)
m1 − p1 = θy1 − ψr (2)
pc1 =( 1− µ)p1 + µ(p2 + e) (3)
w1 − εpc1 = φprod1 − ηu1 + z1 − v1 − t1 (4)
p1 − w1 = −φprod1 − ϕu1 (5)
y1 = n1 + prod1 (6)
u1 = l1 − n1 (7)
All the variables are deﬁned as rates of change, except r and u
that capture the instantaneous changes in the interest rate, and in the
unemployment rate, respectively. All parameters, denoted by Greek letters,
are nonnegative.
Equation (1) represents the goods market equilibrium condition. Output,
y, depends on the world’s interest rate r, the real exchange rate (deﬁned from
the nominal exchange rate, e , and the countries’ relative prices p1and p2),
the other country’s output, and a positive real shock f.
Equation (2) shows the money market equilibrium condition, where m
denotes the money supply, and money demand depends on demestic output,
and the world interest rate.
Equations (3) to (7) represent the aggregate supply of the economy, built
along the lines of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). First, equation (3)
deﬁnes the consumer price index pc, as a weighted average of the domestic
goods’ and the imported goods’ prices in terms of the domestic currency.
Equation (4) shows that nominal wages, w, are determined by the degree
of indexation with respect to the consumer price index, depending on the
parameter ε; labour productivity, prod; the unemployment rate, u;w a g e
pressure factors, z; the error in expectations, captured by the variable v;a n d
the use, as a policy instrument, of a supply-side variable t, which could be
used as a direct way of policy intervention on the labour market. Notice that
4the parameter ε denotes the degree of wage rigidity, with 0 _ ε _ 1;w ew i l l
a s s u m eh e r et h ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a s es ot h a t0 < ε < 1.
In equation (5), prices are set by adding a margin to wages, which depends
on productivity, prod,a n dt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e ,u.W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t
the parameter φ is the same than in the wage-setting equation (4). This
assumption, which simpliﬁes the analysis without altering the basic results,
is commonly used in the literature, and is justiﬁed since in the long term
productivity changes do not aﬀect the unemployment rate (see e.g. Layard,
Nickell and Jackman (1991)).
Finally, equation (6) deﬁnes changes in output as the sum of changes in
employment, n , and productivity, prod. And equation (7) deﬁnes changes in
the unemployment rate, u, in terms of active population, l , and employment,
n.
The transmission of the shocks
From equations (1) to (7), and assuming equilibrium in the goods market,
we can obtain the reduced forms for the two countries (see Appendix).
y1 = Mym1 ± M
0
ym2 + Fyf1 ± F
0
yf2 − Sys1 − S
0
ys2 + Syt1 + S
0
yt2 (8)
y2 = Mym2 ± M
0
ym1 + Fyf2 ± F
0
yf1 − Sys2 − S
0
ys1 + Syt2 + S
0
yt1 (9)
p1 = Mpm1 ± M
0
pm2 + F pf1 + F
0
pf2 + Sps1 + S
0
ps2 − Spt1 − S
0
pt2 (10)
p2 = Mpm2 ± M
0
pm1 + F pf2 + F
0
pf1 + Sps2 + S
0









y, and also Mp > M
0





p. Notice that in order to simplify, for each country i, all the exogenous
supply shocks have been grouped into a contractionary disturbance s,
si = zi − vi − 1
λli − 1
λprodi
5for i =1 ,2,s ot h a ts embodies the negative eﬀect on output of an increase
i nt h ed e g r e eo fw a g ep r e s s u r e ,a sw e l la st h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀects of increases in
the expectations’ errors, active population, and productivity, being λ = 1
η+ϕ.
Equations (8) to (11) show the interdependence between the two
countries, given by the interaction of the variables.
We ﬁnd that a negative supply shock aﬀecting one of the countries (s1,
s2 > 0), leads to a fall in output and a rise in prices in both countries, and
this eﬀect is independent of the channel of transmission and the origin of
the shock. Regarding the supply policy instruments of the countries (t1, t2),
their eﬀects have the same absolute value but the opposite sign as compared
to supply shocks.
In turn, positive demand shocks (m1,m2, f1, f2 > 0) lead to positive
eﬀects on the output and prices of the country of origin of the shock. But
when the shock is transmitted between the two countries, the sign of the
coeﬃcients depends on which channel of transmission prevails. In our model,
the channels of transmission of the demand shocks are the aggregate demand,
the interest rate, the nominal exchange rate, and the countries’ relative
prices.When aggregate demand prevails, the result is the “locomotive eﬀect”:
the eﬀects on the output and prices of the country of origin of the shock
are transmitted to the other country with the same sign, so that we ﬁnd an
aggregate demand expansion coupled with an output expansion an a rise in
prices in all the involved economies. But when changes in the interest rate
and the real exchange rate prevail, the result is the “beggar-thy-neighbour
eﬀect”:t h ee ﬀects on the output and prices of the country of origin of the
shock are transmitted to the other country with the opposite sign.
We have just shown the way in which macroeconomic shocks and supply-
side policies adopted by the countries’ governments, are transmitted between
the two countries. The purpose of the next subsection will be to show to what
extent policy coordination may internalize the potential spillover eﬀects.
2.2 Supply policies coordination
The theoretical arguments supporting policy coordination are based on the
idea that cooperation internalizes the eﬀects of economic interdependence.
In this way, we need to take into account the strategic behaviour of the
authorities, so we will use the Game Theory approach in order to study how
the authorities can deal with shocks.
6We assume that countries 1 and 2 are represented by their authorities,











where the target variables are the rates of change in both output (y1,y 2),a n d
prices (p1,p 2). In order to minimize their loss functions, the authorities will
use as a policy instrument a supply side variable (t1,t 2), aﬀecting the labour
market. We assume π1 6= π2, so we consider asymmetric preferences. On the
other hand, the quadratic form of the loss function implies that any change,
positive or negative, in the variables will represent a loss of utility. So, each
country will minimize its loss function when all the objectives become equal
to zero: y1 = y2 =0and p1 = p2 =0 .
Each country has to minimize its loss function by choosing the optimal
rate of change of the supply side variable, subject to the restrictions imposed
by the international economic framework. We will focus our analysis on the
comparison between the competitive solution and the cooperative solution.
We will show that, in any case, the solutions will depend on the characteristics
of the shocks and on the way in which their eﬀects are transmitted among
countries.
a) Non-cooperative solution: The competitive solution
When each country solves the problem individually, ignoring
interdependence and taking as given the other country’s policy, the solution









s.t.(8) and (10) (14)
from which we obtain the reaction function (see Appendix):
tR,1 = −R1t2 − R2m1 ± R3m2 − R4f1 ± R5f2 + s1 + R1s2 (15)
where all the R’s are positive coeﬃcients.









from which we obtain:
tR,2 = −R1t1 − R2m2 ± R3m1 − R4f2 ± R5f1 + s2 + R1s1 (17)
where all the R’s are again positive coeﬃcients.
The absolute value of each coeﬃcient indicates the size of the response
to shocks. For a supply shock originated in the own country, the coeﬃcient
equals one, so that the use of the supply side variable totally oﬀset the
(adverse) eﬀects of the shock. But when a country has to deal with a shock
from the other country, the supply side variable changes in a proportion lower
than one (since
¯ ¯Ri
¯ ¯ < 1 for i =1 ,...,5.). So, these shocks are not totally
oﬀset, which may indicate that supply-side policies are not the best policies
to cope with that kind of shocks.
Both reaction functions have negative slopes. Given that 0 < R1 < 1,












¯ > 1. On the contrary, for country











¯ < 1.This means that
any movement along the country 1’s reaction function requires a lower
change of the supply-side variable in country 1 than in country 2. In other
words, solving their problems individually, and ignoring interdependence, a
country’s minimization of the changes in its supply-side variable requires a
greater variation of the other country’s variable.
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium is given by the point where the reaction
functions intersect (see Apendix):
tN,1 = −N1,1m1 ± N1,2m2 − N1,3f1 ± N1,4f2 + s1 (18)
tN,2 = −N2,1f1 ± N2,2f2 − N2,3f1 ± N2,4f2 + s2 (19)
8where N1,i;N2,i > 0,i=1 ,...,4.
We can see that in the competitive solution each country only oﬀsets the
supply shock originated in the own country, but not the rest of the shocks.
As it is shown in Appendix, the coeﬃcients of the Nash solution are lower,
in absolute value, than the coeﬃcients of the reaction function. That is,
when solving the problem individually each country acts in a “myopic” way
and, since interdependence is ignored, the eﬀects of supply-side policies are
transmitted abroad.
b) Cooperative solution: The social planner problem
If the countries’ authorities coordinate their policies, they will minimize
the weighted sum of their loss functions. Given the assumption of symmetry,
and making the weights of each country equal to 1
2 for simplicity, the social




















s.t.(8) to (11) (20)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions we obtain (see Appendix):
tC,1 = ±C1,1m1 ± C1,2m2 ± C1,3f1 ± C1,4f2 + C1,5s1 + C1,6s2 (21)
tC,2 = ±C2,1m1 ± C2,2m2 ± C2,3f1 ± C2,4f2 + C2,5s1 + C2,6s2 (22)
where C1,i,C2,i > 0,i=1 ,...,6.
2.3 Welfare aspects of the optimal solution
From a theoretical point of view, the cooperative solution is Pareto
improving since it internalizes the spillover eﬀects arising from economic
interdependence. These externalities, ∂L1
∂t2 and ∂L2
∂t1 ,s h o wh o wt h el o s s
function of a country changes in response to changes in the other country’s
instrument.
9On the one hand, the ﬁrst-order conditions from which we have obtained
the Nash Equilibrium are dL1
dt1 =0and dL2




































which shows how the cooperative solution internalizes externalities. But
the desirability of the cooperative solution will depend on the nature of
the externality. If the externality has the same sign than the shock, the
externality reinforce the eﬀects of the shock. Subsequently, the cooperative
solution requires a greater change of the policy instrument than the
competitive solution. On the contrary, when the externality shows a diﬀerent
sign than the shock, the cooperative solution is the solution that requires the
lowest change of the instrument (see Appendix for details).
In order to avoid the spillover eﬀects of their policies, the countries’
authorities will try to minimize the use of the supply side variable, so that
they identify stabilization with avoiding changes in the policy instrument.
In particular, we have modelled a loss function in which any change in the
variables implies a loss of utility. Since the target variables are linear in the
policy instruments, the solution that requires a lower change in the supply-
side variable would be the optimal solution. So, in a ﬁrst step, authorities
will minimize their loss functions, and, in a second step, they will choose the
solution (competitive or cooperative) with the lower absolute value:
ti =m i n{|tN,i|,|tC,i|} ∀i =1 ,2
It is diﬃcult to know the size of some of the coeﬃcients of the solutions,
since they depend on the coeﬃcients of the reduced form -equations (8)
to (11). For that reason, in order to compare the Nash solution with the
cooperative solution we will make use of graphical analysis. We will take
into account both the slope of the reaction functions, and the sign of the
solutions.
10Graphical analysis
From the reduced form -equations (8)t o( 11)- we can see that the target
variables (y1,y 2)a n d( p1,p 2) are linear in the policy instruments (t1,t 2). So,
we can plot both the reaction functions and the indiﬀerence curves in the
same t1— t2 plane; for simplicity, we will not show the indiﬀerence curves. If
any disturbance takes place, the reaction functions would shift to the left or
to the right according to the particular type of shock.
Figure 1 shows the reaction functions after an expansionary shock in both
countries. In these cases, the authorities ﬁnd optimal a contractionary policy
to oﬀset the eﬀects of the shock, so the reaction functions shift to the left
and the bliss points for countries 1 and 2 are at points B1 =( 0 ,t 2 < 0) and
B2 =( t1 < 0,0) respectively.
The Nash solution is at point N, where the reaction functions intersect.
There are inﬁnite cooperative solutions, but we can focus on the case in which
both countries react in the same way, t1 = t2.I nas y m m e t r i cm o d e l ,w i t h
the same bargaining weights for each country, it is reasonable to assume that
the gains and losses from cooperation would be divided equally. In that case,
the solution -which is the most symmetric possible- is given by point C in
Figure 1. But, in any case, cooperative solutions require a greater change in
the supply side variable than the Nash solution, so that cooperation would
be undesirable.
[Figure 1]
If we depict the case of a contractionary shock leading to a recession in
both countries, the reaction functions would shift to the right (see Figure
2). The Nash solution is at point N in Figure 2, where the reaction
functions intersect, and the symmetric cooperative case, point C,r e q u i r e sa
greater change in the supply side variable than in the Nash solution. Hence,
cooperation would be again undesirable.
[Figure 2]
On the other hand, we can see from the reaction functions -equations (15)
and (17)- that, when a supply shock has its origin in only one of the countries
(i.e., either s1 6=0or s2 6=0 , but not simultaneously), the shift of the reaction
function is greater for the country where the shock occurs. As an example,
11in Figure 3 we depict the case of a contractionary supply shock in country
1(s1 > 0 ). Now, bliss points are B1 =( 0 ,t 2 > 0) and B2 =( t1 > 0,0)
, whereas the competitive solution is given by point N where the reaction
functions intersect. This point coincides with B2. The cooperative solution
is along the line linking B1 and B2, and coincides with a segment of country
1’s reaction function. In this particular case, cooperation would be desirable
for country 1 but undesirable for country 2, which has not suﬀered the shock.
The reason is that along the line linking B1 and B2, changes in country 1’s
supply-side instrument are lower compared with the case in which country 1
acts individually.
[Figure 3]
We have just shown that supply-side policy coordination would result
undesirable for the countries, when they cope with shocks that are transmited
with the same sign to both countries. However, for supply shocks,
cooperation could be desirable, but only for the country where the shock
occurs. It can be proved that the cases studied above are those in which
the aggregate demand prevails as the way of transmission of the shocks,
and the shocks are transmited with the same sign between the countries.
This channel of transmission leads to the “locomotive eﬀect”: for positive
shocks externalities are also positive, and for negative shocks externalities
are negative. For that reason cooperation would be undesirable, since it
internalizes externalities that reinforce the eﬀect of the shock and requires a
greater change in the supply-side variable. So, in order to avoid some of the
adverse eﬀects, it would be preferable not to coordinate. This result holds
also in the case depicted in Figure 3, where cooperation results desirable only
for one country.
In contrast, diﬀerent results for the desirability of coordination can appear
when expansionary (contractionary) demand shocks in a country of the union
translate into a contraction (expansion) to the other country. This possibility
appears when the interest rate and the real exchange rate prevail as channels
of transmission of the shocks, leading to the “beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect”,
so that externalities have the opposite sign than the shock. Accordingly,
cooperation would be desirable since it oﬀsets the eﬀects of the shock and
requires a lower change in the supply-side variable. Figures 4 and 5 show
the alternative possibilities in which cooperation proves to be desirable. In
both cases, when the output of a country expands, the output of the other
12falls and cooperation results desirable since cooperative solutions require a
lower change in the supply-side variable (see point C which represents the
cooperative symmetric case) as compared to the Nash solution (point N).
[Figure 4]
[Figure 5]
Summarising the results obtained so far, we can derive the conditions
under which coordination of supply policies could be desirable. These
conditions are presented in Table 2.1, and we can conclude that the results
are determined not only by the origin of the shock (country 1 or country
2), but also by its nature (monetary, real or supply-side), and the channel
of transmission. In the case of supply shocks, cooperation always results
undesirable for the two countries as a whole, but when dealing with demand
shocks, the channel of transmission proves to be determinant.
table 2.1
DESIRABILITY OF SUPPLY POLICY COORDINATION IN A TWO-COUNTRY MODEL
SHOCK cooperation
Monetary (m1,m 2) • “Locomotive eﬀect”: undesirable
• “Beggar-thy-neigbour eﬀect”: desirable
Real (f1,f 2) • “Locomotive eﬀect”: undesirable
• “Beggar-thy-neigbour eﬀect”: desirable
Supply (s1,s 2) Undesirable
3 The model for a monetary union
3.1 Setup of the model
In this section the two symmetric economies of section 2, country 1 and
country 2, form a monetary union. The economic framework of the union’s
member countries is given again by equations (1) to (7) of the previous section
for country 1, and the corresponding symmetric equations for country 2. But
for describing a monetary union, these two sets of equations are modiﬁed in
13the following way: ﬁrst, the nominal exchange rate is made equal to zero; and,
second, both countries replace each individual money market equilibrium
condition (equation (2) for country 1, and the symmetric one for country 2)













y2 − ψr (25)
In equation (25), m denotes the union’s money supply, so the demand for
money depends on the output of the countries, and the union’s interest rate.
Notice that, since all the variables are in rates of change, the variables of
the monetary union are equal to the weighted sum of the member countries’
variables, and we can assume that their relative weights reﬂect the bargaining









where x,x1,x 2 are the rates of change of each variable for the union, country
1, and country 2 respectively; Y,Y1,Y 2 are their levels of output, and Y1+




The transmission of the shocks
As can be seen in Appendix, we can obtain the reduced forms for the two
countries.
y1 = Mym + Fyf1 ± F
0
yf2 − Sys1 − S
0
ys2 + Syt1 + S
0
yt2 (26)
y2 = Mym + Fyf2 ± F
0
yf1 − Sys2 − S
0
ys1 + Syt2 + S
0
yt1 (27)
p1 = Mpm + Fpf1 ± F
0
pf2 + Sps1 + S
0
ps2 − Spt1 − S
0
pt2 (28)
p2 = Mpm + Fpf2 ± F
0
pf1 + Sps2 + S
0
ps1 − Spt2 − S
0
pt1 (29)
where Fy >F 0
y,S y >S 0
y,and also Fp >F 0
p,S p >S 0
p. Again, to simplify,
for each country i, all the exogenous supply shocks have been grouped in
a contractionary disturbance si,f o ri =1 ,2,d e ﬁned as in the two-country
model.
14We ﬁnd that for a negative supply shock aﬀecting one of the countries of
the union (s1, s2 > 0), the same result than in the two-country model holds:
an output fall and a rise in prices.
In turn, positive demand shocks (m, f1, f2 > 0)a l s ol e a dt op o s i t i v e
eﬀects on the output and prices of the country of origin of the shock. But
for the particular case of real shocks ( f1, f2 > 0) when they are transmitted
between the countries of the union, the sign of the coeﬃcients depends on
which channel of transmission prevails: the aggregate demand or the interest
rate, and the monetary union’s relative prices. In other words: a real shock
m a yl e a dt ob o t ht h e“ locomotive eﬀect” or the “beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect”.
This alternative does not hold for monetary shocks, in contrast with the two-
country model, and the reason is that a monetary union does not allow for
country-speciﬁc monetary shocks. In consequence, a monetary shock will
always be a symmetric shock within a monetary union.
After analysing the way in which macroeconomic shocks are transmitted
between the countries of the monetary union, we will show in the next
subsection to what extent policy coordination may internalize the potential
spillover eﬀects.
3.2 Supply policies coordination in a monetary union
We assume that countries 1 and 2 are represented by their authorities, which















where the target variables are the rates of change in output (y1,y 2),i n
the budget deﬁcit (g1,g 2), and also in prices (p1,p 2). In this context, the
objective of prices captures the cost of the authorities’ intervention in terms
of inﬂation. In addition, the fact that the disciplining eﬀects of a monetary
union imply some restrictions on ﬁscal policy, allows us to include the budget
deﬁcit as an objective of the authorities. An example of this situation is
the European monetary union, where each member country has to fulﬁlt h e
budget deﬁcit requirements of the Pact for Stability and Growth. In order to
minimize their loss functions, the authorities will use as a policy instrument
15a supply side variable (t1,t 2).W ea l s oa s s u m eσ1 6= σ2 and π1 6= π2,s ow e
consider asymmetric preferences. On the other hand, as explained in section
2, the quadratic form of the loss function implies that any change, positive
or negative, in the variables will represent a loss of utility. So, each country
will minimize its loss function when all the objectives become equal to zero:
y1 = y2 =0 , g1 = g2 =0 ,a n dp1 = p2 =0 .
Next, we will show the eﬀects of the authorities’ decisions when coping
with shocks.
a) Non-cooperative solution: The competitive solution










s.t.(26) and (28) (32)
and the reaction function of country 1 (see Appendix):
tR,1 = −R1t2 − R2f1 ± R3f2 − R4m + s1 + R1s2 (33)
where all the R’s are positive.











from which we obtain:
tR,2 = −R1t1 − R2f2 ± R3f1 − R4m + s2 + R1s1 (35)
where all the R’s are again positive.
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium is given by the point where the reaction
functions intersect:
tN,1 = −N1,1f1 ± N1,2f2 − N1,3m + s1 (36)
tN,2 = ±N2,1f1 − N2,2f2 − N2,3m + s2 (37)
16where N1,i;N2,i > 0,i=1 ,2,3.
b) Cooperative solution: The social planner problem
With the weights of each country equal to 1

























s.t.(26) to (29) (38)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions we obtain (see Appendix):
tC,1 = ±C1,1f1 ± C1,2f2 − C1,3m + C1,4s1 + C1,5s2 (39)
tC,2 = ±C2,1f1 ± C2,2f2 − C2,3m + C2,4s1 + C2,5s2 (40)
where C1,i;C2,i > 0,i=1 ,...,5.
When shocks are transmitted leading to the “locomotive eﬀect” the
authorities use contractionary supply-side policies when dealing with
expansionary shocks, and expansionary supply-side policies when dealing
with contractionary shocks. Moreover, both in the competitive solution and
in the cooperative solution, the sign (expansionary or contractionary) of the
policy is the same than in the optimal response given by the reaction function.
But in the “beggar-thy-neighbour” case, the supply-side policies used to
deal whit real shocks from the monetary union have an ambiguous sign.
From this result we can conclude that the cooperative solution will not
always coincide with the optimal response given by the reaction function,
since in those cases the instability of the cooperative solution would increase.
The reason is that the cooperative solution would not be on the reaction
function and, in addition, would not coincide with the optimal individual
policy response of each country.
3.3 Welfare aspects of the optimal solution
From the reduced form -equations (26)t o( 29)- we can see that the target
variables (y1,y 2)a n d( p1,p 2) are linear in the policy instruments (t1,t 2). So,
17we can plot both the reaction functions and the indiﬀerence curves in the t1—
t2 plane, in the same way that in the two-country model (subsection 2.2).
If the authorities ﬁnd optimal a contractionary (expansionary) policy
to oﬀset the eﬀects of the shock, the reaction functions shift to the left
(right). When the aggregate demand is the channel of transmission of
the shocks, supply-side policy coordination in a monetary union would
result undesirable for the union member countries, when they cope with
demand shocks in general (see Figures 1 and 2). However, for supply shocks
within the monetary union, cooperation could be desirable, but only for the
country where the shock occurs (see Figure 3). It can be proved that (see
Appendix), in the “locomotive eﬀect” case, for positive shocks externalities
are also positive, and for negative shocks externalities are negative. For that
reason cooperation would be undesirable, since it internalizes externalities
that reinforce the eﬀect of the shock and requires a greater change in the
institutional variable. So, in order to avoid some of the adverse eﬀects, it
would be preferable not to coordinate.
On the other hand, diﬀerent results about the desirability of coordination
would appear when expansionary (contractionary) real shocks in a country
of the union translate into a contraction (expansion) to the other country.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that when the output of a country expands, the
output of the other falls and cooperation results desirable since cooperative
solutions require a lower change in the supply-side variable (see point C
which represents the cooperative symmetric case) as compared to the Nash
solution (point N).
Summarising the results obtained, we can derive the conditions under
which coordination of supply policies may be desirable. These conditions
are presented in Table 3.1, and show that for monetary and supply shocks,
cooperation always results undesirable, but when dealing with real shocks,
the channel of transmission proves to be determinant.
In particular, we ﬁnd that cooperation may be desirable for shocks leading
to diﬀe r e n t( a s y m m e t r i c )e ﬀects between the two countries. In a monetary
union, this happens only for real shocks transmitted through the “beggar-
thy-neighbour eﬀect”, whereas monetary and supply-side shocks always lead
to identical (symmetric) eﬀects.
18table 3.1
DESIRABILITY OF SUPPLY POLICY COORDINATION IN A MONETARY UNION
SHOCK cooperation
Monetary (m) Undesirable
Real (f1,f 2) • “Locomotive eﬀect”: undesirable
• “Beggar-thy-neigbour eﬀect”: desirable
Supply (s1,s 2) Undesirable
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to analyse the desirability of supply-side
intervention within a monetary union when dealing with shocks, provided
that the countries suﬀer some restrictions in the use of ﬁscal policy. In order
to oﬀset the eﬀects of the shocks the authorities use as a policy instrument
a supply-side variable which could be interpreted as a way of institutional
intervention on the labour market.
First, we developed a simple two-country model, that was later modiﬁed
in order to describe a monetary union. After analysing the solutions for
the two alternatives, we could conclude that coordinated labour market
intervention would be desirable when the eﬀects of the shocks are diﬀerent in
the involved economies, and so requiring a diﬀerent policy response; in other
words, when shocks are asymmetric. According to our results, this occurs
when the “beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect” is the channel of transmission of
demand shocks, both monetary and real, in the two-country model; and only
of real shocks in the monetary union.
Summarising, a monetary union would require less use of coordinated
supply-side intervention than a two-country model, since it would be
desirable only for real shocks transmitted through the “beggar-thy-neighbour
eﬀect”. The reason is that a monetary union does not allow for country-
speciﬁc monetary shocks and, accordingly, these are always transmitted in
the same way across the union’s member countries; i.e., they are always
symmetric. On the contrary, when monetary policy is conducted at the
national level, we ﬁnd that country-speciﬁc monetary shocks can lead to
ambiguous eﬀects across the two economies, depending on the transmission
mechanism.
19In other words, a monetary union would make monetary shocks always
symmetric. Therefore, a monetary union would reduce the room for the
cooperative setting of supply-side intervention, given that cooperation would
be desirable only when dealing with asymmetric shocks.
As can be seen from the results, the country-speciﬁco r i g i no ft h e
shocks to deal with is not the only relevant characteristic when deciding
whether coordination over intervention is desirable or not. The nature
(demand or supply) and the channel of transmission of the shocks will
be also determinant. For this reason, it would be crucial to know which
would be the channel of transmission and the kind of disturbances actually
prevailing in a particular monetary union. In relation to this, recall that
Viñals and Jimeno (1998) proposed supply policies as a way to deal with
real shocks in a monetary union. Linking this to our conclusions, if real
shocks from the monetary union would prevail, and their eﬀects would be
transmitted according to the “beggar-thy-neighbour” eﬀect, the desirability




5.1.1 The reduced form










where D = ψ + αθ
and, similarly, for country 2:
yd
2 = α
D(m2 − p2) −
βψ





From equations (3) to (7), and replacing, we obtain the aggregate supply
of country 1:
ys
1 = −λ(ε − 1)p1 − λεµ(e + p2 − p1) − λs1 + λt1 (A.1.3)
where λ = 1
η+ϕ and s1 = z1 − v1 − 1
λl1 − 1
λprod1
and similarly for country 2:
ys
2 = −λ(ε − 1)p2 + λεµ(e + p2 − p1) − λs2 + λt2 (A.1.4)
From equation (2) in the main text, we obtain the equilibrium output
in the money market, and replace it into the goods market equilibrium
condition (equation (1)). Doing the same in the equations for country 2,
and substracting, we obtain the real exchange rate between country 1 and
country 2:
(e + p2 − p1)=
(m1−p1)−(m2−p2)−δθ(y1−y2)−θ(f1−f2)
2βθ (A.1.5)
Replacing (A.1.1) and the world interest rate, r, from equation (2) into
equation (1) we obtain:
21y1 = a1m1 − a1p1 − a2m1 + a2p2 + a3y2 + a4f1 + a4f2 (A.1.6)
and:
y2 = a1m2 − a1p2 − a2m2 + a2p2 + a3y1 + a4f1 + a4f2 (A.1.7)
Then, replacing (A.1.5) into the aggregate demand and aggregate supply
-equations (A.1.3) and (A.1.4) - we obtain the following expressions:
p1 = a5m1+a5p2−a5m2+a6y1−a7y2−a8f1+a8f2+a9s1−a9t1 (A.1.8)























with a1 >a 2,a 2 >a 4,a 4 >a 3,a 6 >a 5,a n da8 >a 7 and the denominators
are all positive.
To obtain the equilibrium values for output and prices, we need to solve





1 −a3 a1 −a2
−a3 1 −a2 a1
−a7 a8 1 −a6





























Equations (8) to (11) in the main text are the solution, where the
coeﬃcients are:
My =[ a5(a1 + a2)(−1+a3 + a5 − a6(a1 − a2)) + a1(a1a7 − a3a5 + a2a6)−
a2(a3 + a2(a6 + a7)) + a1(1 − a2
5 + a6(a1 − a2a5)+a7(a2 − a1a5))]Á∆
22M0
y =[ a5(a1 + a2)(1 − a3 − a5 − a7(a1 − a2)) − a2(a1a7 − a3a5 + a2a6)+
a1(a3 +a2a6 +a1a7))− a2(1 − a2
5 + a6(a1 − a2a5)+a7(a2 − a1a5))]Á∆
F y =[ a4(1 − a2
5(1 + a3)+a3 +( a1 + a2)(a6 + a7)(1 − a5))+
a8((a1 + a2)(1 − a2
5(1 + a3) − a3 +( a1 − a2)(a6 + a7)))]Á∆
F 0
y =[ a4(1 − a2
5(1 + a3)+a3 +( a1 + a2)(a6 + a7)(1 − a5))−
a8((a1 + a2)(1 − a2
5(1 + a3) − a3 +( a1 − a2)(a6 + a7)))]Á∆




y =[ a9(a2(1 + a3a5) − a7(a2
1 − a2
2) − a1(a3 + a5))]Á∆
Mp =[ a5((1 − a2
3)(1 − a5)+a6((1 + a5)(a1 − a2a3)+2 a5(a1a3 − a2)+
a6(a2
1 − a2




p =[ ( 1− a5)(a6(a1a3 − a2)+a7(a2a3 − a1) − a5(1 − a2
3))]Á∆
F p =[ a4(a6 + a7)((1 + a3)(1 + a5)+( a1 + a2)(a6 + a7))−
a8(1 − a3)((1 + a3)(1 − a5)+( a1 − a2)(a6 − a7)]Á∆
F 0
p =[ a4(a6 + a7)((1 + a3)(1 + a5)+( a1 + a2)(a6 + a7))+
a8(1 − a3)((1 + a3)(1 − a5)+( a1 − a2)(a6 − a7)]Á∆
Sp =[ ( 1− a2
3)+a6(a1 − a2a3)+a7(a2 − a1a3)]Á∆
S0
p =[ a5(1 − a2
3)+a6(a2 − a1a3)+a7(a1 − a2a3)]Á∆
∆ =[ 1− a2
5(1 − a2
3) − a2
3 + a1a6(2 + a1a6 +2 a3a5)+a2a7(2 + a2a7 +2 a3a5)
− a2a6(2a5 + a2a6 +2 a3) − a1a7(2a5 + a1a7 +2 a3)] > 0
235.1.2 The coeﬃcients of the reaction functions
The coeﬃcients are equal, in absolute value, in both the “locomotive
eﬀect” and the “beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect” cases.
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ym2 + F yf1 + F
0
yf2 − Sys1 − S
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pm2 + Fpf1 + F
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0













ym1 + Mym2 + F
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5.2 The model for a monetary union
5.2.1 The reduced form












where D =2 ψ + αθ












We also obtain the aggregate supply of country 1:
ys
1 = −λ(ε − 1)p1 − λεµ(p2 − p1) − λs1 + λt1 (A.2.3)
where λ = 1
η+ϕ and s1 = z1 − v1 − 1
λl1 − 1
λprod1
26and for country 2:
ys
2 = −λ(ε − 1)p2 + λεµ(p2 − p1) − λs2 + λt2 (A.2.4)
To obtain the reduced form, we need to solve the system given by















































1−ε(1−µ) g = 2α
2ψ+αθ h =
2ψ
2ψ+αθ i = 1
1−ε(1−µ)
being 0 <a<1,b>cand 0 <e<1
The solution is given by equations (26) to (29) in the main text,
y1 = Mym + Fyf1 ± F
0
yf2 − Sys1 − S
0
ys2 + Syt1 + S
0
yt2
y2 = Mym + Fyf2 ± F
0
yf1 − Sys2 − S
0
ys1 + Syt2 + S
0
yt1
p1 = Mpm + Fpf1 ± F
0
pf2 + Sps1 + S
0
ps2 − Spt1 − S
0
pt2
p2 = Mpm + Fpf2 ± F
0
pf1 + Sps2 + S
0
ps1 − Spt2 − S
0
pt1






























being ∆ =( 1− e2)+2 d(b + ce)+( ae + bd)2 − (a − cd)2 > 0
5.2.2 The coeﬃcients of the reaction functions
The coeﬃcients are equal, in absolute value, in both the “locomotive eﬀect”
and the “beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect” cases.































































N2,1 = N1,2 N2,2 = N1,1 N2,3 = N1,3
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Figure 3: Contractionary supply shock in country 1. Cooperation desirable for country 1 












Figure 4: Expansionary demand shock in country 1, contractionary in country 2. 













Figure 5: Expansionary demand shock in country 2, contractionary in country 1. 
Cooperation undesirable. 